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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE 
CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE ) 
CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA and ) 
CATHERINE BUELL, in her official capacity ) 
as President and CEO of The Housing ) 
Authority of the City of Atlanta, Georgia, ) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
INTEGRAL DEVELOPMENT, LLC; 
GRADY REDEVELOPMENT, LLC; 
CAPITOL GATEWAY, LLC; 
HARRIS REDEVELOPMENT, LLC and 
CARVER REDEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs, 
V. 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 
20 l 7CV294880 
Bus. Case Div. 1 
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS 
The above-styled matter is before the Court on various pending motions, to wit: 
(1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint ("Defendants' Motion to Dismiss"); 
(2) Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Motion to Add Counterclaim Defendant ("Developer 
Entities' Motion to Add Counterclaim Defendant"); (3) AHA's Motion to Dismiss Defendants' 
Counterclaims ("AHA's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim"); and (4) Plaintiff's Motion to Extend 
the 90-Day Stay of Discovery. Having considered the pleadings and argument of counsel at a 
March 7, 2018 hearing held in this matter, the Court finds as follows: 
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SUMMARY OF FACTS 
This case involves the validity and enforceability of various option agreements to 
purchase parcels of real estate in and around four separate revitalization projects developed by 
Defendants. Plaintiff Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta ("AHA") is the largest public 
housing authority in Georgia, and its mission is to facilitate or provide housing assistance to 
eligible low-income households. Between 1999 and 2002, AHA and Defendants Grady 
Redevelopment LLC, Capitol Gateway LLC, Harris Redevelopment LLC, and Carver 
Redevelopment LLC ( co11ective1y the "Developer Entities") entered into four Revitalization 
Agreements which required the Developer Entities to develop four different sites in multiple 
phases, reserving certain rental units for affordable public housing and certain single-family 
homes for sale to eligible low-income families. The revitalization projects-which are funded by 
federal grants and are subject to a regulatory scheme promulgated by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development ("HUD")-divided development work into several phases. Earlier 
phases focused on satisfying HUD's public housing requirements and later phases contemplated 
market-driven development on certain identified tracts in and around the redeveloped 
communities ("Further Leverage Properties") on which market rate development would be 
permissible. 
In 2011, after HUD-mandated components of the Revitalization Agreements were 
completed, AHA and the Developer Entities executed Amendments to each Revitalization 
Agreement. These Amendments address the Further Leverage Properties and include, inter alia: 
an Option Agreement to purchase the Further Leverage Properties through one or more "owner 
entities" ( comprised of the Developer Entity and AHA) and to share all profits and losses of the 
development; an approval process under which AHA is to submit the contemplated conveyance 
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to its Board of Commissioners together with a recommendation from AHA staff to consummate 
the conveyance; and an appraisal process and method for calculating the purchase price. 
On Nov. 3, 2016, each Developer Entity exercised its respective Option Agreement. On 
Dec. I, 2016, AHA responded to the exercise notices, claiming they were deficient. On Feb. 1, 
2017, AHA's Board voted against moving forward with the appraisal process. After additional 
negotiations, the Developer Entities each sent a notice of default to AHA on Aug. 11, 2017. 
Seven days later, AHA responded, denying that it was in default. 
AHA initiated this lawsuit as a declaratory judgment action, asserting seven counts 
seeking the following declarations, respectively: 
(I) conditions precedent have not been satisfied and AHA is not in breach of 
any agreement; 
(2) the recommendation requirements in the Option Agreements (requiring 
AHA's CEO to submit Defendants' notice of intent to exercise the purchase 
options with a recommendation to the Board to accept the offers) violates the 
Georgia Constitution which makes the CEO a fiduciary of AHA who is required 
to exercise her best judgment to make decisions in AHA's best interest; 
(3) the Revitalization Agreements and Option Agreements would place an 
impermissible financial obligation on AHA if it decides to terminate the parties' 
agreements for cause, a monetary obligation which violates O.C.G.A. § 36-30- 
3(a) insofar as it impedes AHA's ability to operate freely; 
( 4) The contractual provisions in the Amendments are unenforceable and 
unconscionable on grounds of public policy; 1 
(5) Defendants have breached contractual provisions by demanding 
performance prior to and inconsistent with the requirements set forth in the 
parties' agreements and by insisting on enforcement of contractual provisions 
that call for the development of public land intended for low-income housing 
without providing such housing thereby preventing AI~'s performance and 
depriving it of the benefit of the agreement; 
AH.A alleges that the Amendments and Option Agreements allow the Developer Entities to purchase land 
at circa 2007 pricing using a commercially unreasonable formula, depriving AHA of the land needed to meet its 
low-income housing mission and contravening federal regulations. 
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( 6) Defendants would be unjustly enriched if the contracts are enforced as 
Defendants demand; and 
(7) specific performance is not an available remedy for Defendants.2 
In Counterclaims, the Developer Entities (specifically Grady LLC, Capitol LLC, Harris 
LLC, and Carver LLC) argue the Amendments and Option Agreements are enforceable; the 
Option Agreements allow the Developer Entities to purchase real estate in and around the 
redeveloped properties; and, because the Option Agreements supersede the Revitalization 
Agreements, the Developer Entities have the sole discretion whether to incorporate affordable 
housing units. The Developer Entities assert a counterclaim that includes five counts: (1) breach 
of contract for refusing to accept the Developer Entities' Exercise Notices and repudiating 
AHA's obligations under the Amendments and Option Agreements; (2) request for a writ of 
mandamus to require CEO Buell to submit the contemplated conveyances to AHA's Board, 
recommend that the Board accept the contemplated conveyances, and participate in the appraisal 
process as set forth in the Amendments and Option Agreements; (3) specific performance to 
compel AHA to take the necessary steps to sell the Further Leverage Properties to the entities 
designated by the Developer Entities; (4) promissory estoppel; and (5) attorney's fees and 
expenses. 
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, asserting the complaint is not 
appropriate for declaratory judgment. Additionally, the Developer Entities have moved to add a 
counterclaim defendant to the case, Catherine Buell, in her official capacity as President and 
CEO of The Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, Georgia. The Developer Entities contend 
this addition is necessary to "obtain complete relief' as asserted in their counterclaim. Finally, 
AHA has moved to dismiss the Developer Entities' counterclaim for failure to state a claim. 
2 AHA claims that the provisions sought to be enforced are unenforceable, subject to unsatisfied conditions 
precedent, and/or are not ripe, are too vague, contingent, remote, or indefinite to be specifically performed. 
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ANALYSIS 
A. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss 
A motion to dismiss brought under O.C.G.A. §9-11-12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless: 
(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the 
claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable 
facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that 
the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the 
framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the 
relief sought. .. 
Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774-75 (2014) (citing Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2) 
(1997)); Abramyan v. State, 301 Ga. 308, 309 (2017), reconsideration denied (June 5, 2017). 
"When the sufficiency of the complaint is questioned by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim for which relief may be granted, the rules require that it be construed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff with all doubts resolved in his favor even though unfavorable 
constructions are possible." Cobb Cty. v. Jones Grp. P.L.C., 218 Ga. App. 149, 152 (1995) 
(citing Time Ins. Co. v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 211 Ga. App. 34, 35 (1993)). 
B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is "to settle and afford relief from 
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." O.C.G.A. § 9- 
4-1. "Declaratory judgment relief looks to the future. 'The object of the declaratory judgment is 
to permit determination of a controversy before obligations are repudiated or rights are 
violated."' A & H Sod. Inc. v. Johnson. 279 Ga. App. 252, 253 (2006). Thus, "a party seeking 
declaratory judgment must show facts or circumstances whereby it is in a position of uncertainty 
or insecurity because of a dispute and of having to take some future action which is properly 
incident to its alleged right, and which future action without direction from the court might 
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reasonably jeopardize its interest." Pinnacle Benning LLC v. Clark Realty Capital. LLC. 314 Ga. 
App. 609, 613 (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); Jahncke Service. 
Inc. v. Deprutment of Trru1sp., 134 Ga. App. 106, 108 (1975) ("[W]here the courts have found 
that lights have accrued, the plaintiffs seeking the declaration of their rights had already denied 
the claim or had otherwise taken a firm position as to their rights or liabilities. Those plaintiffs 
were not 'walking in the dark' ... but had affirmatively acted"). 
Here, AHA's arguable position of uncertainty is whether the parties' agreements are 
enforceable. If the Amendments and Option Agreements are enforceable, AHA will be bound to 
proceed with the sale of the properties as described therein. However, AHA has already 
repudiated the agreements by: refusing the Developer Entities' Exercise Notice, including 
refusing to "submit the contemplated conveyances of a parcel to its Board [] ... with a 
recommendation by AHA staff to consummate such conveyance [] within two months following 
exercise by [the] Developer of its purchase rights under the Option Agreement."; voting against 
moving forward with the appraisal process under the Option Agreements; refuting the Developer 
Entities' Default Notices; and refusing to take the necessary actions to effectuate the property 
transfers contemplated in the parties' agreements. AHA is no longer in a position of uncertainty 
because it has already taken a firm position with respect to the agreements, and now seeks 
judicial approval of those actions retrospectively. 
In essence, AHA merely seeks to test its defenses to the enforcement of the Amendments 
and Option Agreements, but such is not the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Drawdy v. 
Direct Gen. Ins. Co., 277 Ga. 107, I 09 (2003) ("Declaratory judgment is not available to a party 
merely to test the viability of its defenses"). However, since AHA has already taken a firm 
position as to its rights and liabilities, it is no longer in a position of uncertainty. Given the 
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foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 1s hereby GRANTED and AHA's claims for 
declaratory relief are DISMJSSED.3 
C. Developer Entities' Motion to Add Counterclaim Defendant 
"The right to the extraordinary writ of mandamus exists only upon meeting a two[-]prong 
test: (1) the applicant must demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought, and (2) there must 
be no other adequate remedy." Tyner v. Zant, 255 Ga. 405, 405 (1986) (citing Carnes v. 
Crawford, 246 Ga. 677, 678 (1980)). See O.C.G.A. §9-6-20 el seq. As summarized by the 
Supreme Court of Georgia: 
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to compel a public officer to 
perform a required duty when there is no other adequate legal remedy. It is 
a discretionary remedy that courts may grant only when the petitioner has 
a clear legal right to the relief sought or the public official bas committed a 
gross abuse of discretion. In general, mandamus relief is not available to 
compel officials to follow a general course of conduct, perform a 
discretionary act, or undo a past act. 
R.A.F. v. Robinson, 286 Ga. 644, 646 (2010) (citations omitted). Importantly, mandamus is 
meant to combat "improper government inaction-the failure of a public official to perform a 
clear duty." Bland Farms LLC v. Ga. Dept. of Ag., 281 Ga. 192, 193 (2006); Bibb Cty. v. 
Monroe Cty., 294 Ga. 730, 734 (2014). 
Here, Defendants seek to add Ms. Buell so that she can be compelled to make the 
recommendation to the AHA Board that it approve the Developer Entities' proposed 
conveyances and participate in the appraisal process, as set forth in the Amendments and Option 
Agreements. Without the cooperation of AHA's CEO, the sale cannot be consummated as 
contemplated in the agreements and, as alleged in the counterclaim, no remedy at law would 
adequately compensate for this. Further, assuming (without deciding) that the Developer Entities 
3 As a result of this dismissal, no remaining claims implicate Integral Development, LLC and it is therefore 
no longer a party to this action. 
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prevail on their claims, they would have a right to the relief sought as the recommendation and 
sale would be a clear legal duty that Ms. Buell would be failing to perform-an appropriate 
application of mandamus relief. See O.C.G.A. § 9-6-23 ("A private person may by mandamus 
enforce the performance by a corporation of a public duty as to matters in which he has a special 
interest"). Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Add Counterclaim Defendant is hereby 
GRANTED. 
D. AHA's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim 
1. Co1111t /: Breach of contract 
"The elements for a breach of contract claim in Georgia are the (1) breach and the 
(2) resultant damages (3) to the party who has the right to complain about the contract being 
broken." SAWS at Seven Hills. LLC v. Forestar Realty, Inc., 342 Ga. App. 780, 784 (2017). 
Here, the Developer Entities allege that AHA breached a contractual duty by failing to 
appoint its appraiser, thereby frustrating their ability to comply with the preconditions that AHA 
now argues are unmet. They further assert that AHA absolutely has refused to comply with its 
contractual obligations. The Developer Entities have sufficiently stated a claim for breach of 
contract. Whether conditions precedent have not been met, as AHA alleges, or whether AHA has 
refused to comply with its obligations thereby making satisfaction of the conditions precedent 
impossible, as the Developer Entities assert, cannot be resolved by the pleadings and is better 
addressed after discovery. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Count I of the 
counterclaim. 
2. Count JI: Request for writ of mandamus (Catherine Buell) 
As discussed in Prut B, supra, mandamus is meant to combat "the failure of a public 
official to perform a clear duty" (Bland Farms LLC, 281 Ga. at 193; Bibb Cty., 294 Ga. at 734). 
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O.C.G.A. §9-6-23 specifically provides that "[a] private person may by mandamus enforce the 
performance by a corporation of a public duty as to matters in which he has a special interest." 
Georgia courts have long recognized the right of private individuals to use mandamus to enforce 
contractual rights against public officials. See, e.g., Leonard v. House, 15 Ga. 473, 473 (1854) 
(holding a private individual could seek mandamus to compel payment under a contract with 
Talbot County to build a bridge); Chambers v. Fulford, 268 Ga. 892 (1998) (affirming grant of 
mandamus where board of tax assessors sought to compel county board of commissioners to 
appropriate funds necessary to fulfill terms of tax appraiser's employment contract which had 
been approved by former board of commissioners). 
As noted above, here, assuming the agreements at issue are enforceable, without the 
cooperation of AHA' s CEO the subject land conveyances cannot be consummated as 
contemplated in the agreements. Evidence could be introduced within the framework of the 
pleadings to establish that no remedy at law would adequately compensate for this. Construing 
the pleadings in the light most favor to the Developer Entities and resolving all doubts in their 
favor even though unfavorable constructions are possible, they have at least stated a claim for 
mandamus relief. Accordingly, AHA's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Count II of the 
counterclaim. 
3. Count Ill: Specific Performance 
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §23-2-130, "[s]pecific performance of a contract, if within the 
power of the party, will be decreed, generally, whenever the damages recoverable at law would 
not be an adequate compensation for nonperformance." An action seeking specific performance 
seeks equitable relief. Lemke v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 182 Ga. App. 700, 700, 356 
S.E.2d 739,740 (1987); Cochran v. Teasley, 239 Ga. 289,291,236 S.E.2d635, 637 (1977). 
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AHA urges there is no cause of action for the remedy of "specific performance" without 
an underlying contractual breach and, as such, the claim is duplicative and should be dismissed. 
As clearly acknowledged by the Developer Entities, they "are seeking damages and specific 
performance as remedies for the AHA's serial breaches of the agreements.t'" Further, the 
Revitalization Agreements contain a provision which expressly authorizes a "Non-Breaching 
Party" to seek specific performance "in addition to any other right or remedy available" upon a 
material breach of the agreement. Insofar as under the relevant authorities and the parties' 
agreements, specific performance is a remedy which may be available upon a breach of the 
parties' agreements and the Developer Entities, here, have asserted a separate cause of action for 
breach of contract, the Court hereby DISM1SSES Count III of the counterclaim as an 
independent cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court finds the Developer Entities may still 
pursue specific performance as a remedy for their breach of contract claim, if the agreements are 
ultimately found to be enforceable and breach of the agreements and the unavailability of an 
adequate remedy at law are established. 
4. Count IV: Promissory estoppel 
To prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, a claimant must show that (1) the opposing 
party made certain promises, (2) the opposing party should have expected that the claimant 
would rely on such promises, (3) the claimant did in fact rely on such promises to the claimant's 
detriment, and (4) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. Canterbury 
Forest Assn. v. Collins, 243 Ga. App. 425, 428(2) (2000) (citing Sparra v. Deutsche Bank Nat. 
Tr. Co., 336 Ga. App. 418,421 (2016)). 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to the Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, Georgia's 
Motion to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaims, p. I 0. 
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In their counterclaim, the Developer Entities allege that, in the event the written 
agreements are found to be unenforceable, they should be entitled to recover under a theory of 
promissory estoppel because they undertook the HUD required components of the revitalization 
projects in reliance upon the promised right to engage in market rate development thereafter.5 
Having considered the pleadings, the Court finds the Developer Entities have sufficiently pled 
their promissory estoppel claim. Further, although they have separately asserted a claim for 
breach of contract, under Georgia's Civil Practice Act the Developer Entities are entitled to plead 
promissory estoppel in the alternative. See O.C.G.A. §9-2-4 ("A plaintiff may pursue any 
number of consistent or inconsistent remedies against the same person or different persons until 
he shall obtain a satisfaction from some of them"). See also Rental Equip. Grp:, LLC v. MACI, 
LLC, 263 Ga. App. 155, 587 S.E.2d 364 (2003) (holding issue of whether promise to buy 
business was enforceable was for the jury in sellers' action for breach of contract and promissory 
estoppel). Thus, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Count IV. 
5. Count V: Attorneys' Fees and Expenses 
"The general rule is that 'an award of attorney fees and expenses of litigation are not 
available to the prevailing party unless authorized by statute or contract."? Singh v. Sterling 
Unjted, Inc., 326 Ga. App. 504, 512, 756 S.E.2d 728, 736 (2014) (citing Cary v. Guiragossian, 
270 Ga. 192, 195(4), 508 S.E.2d 403 (1998)). 
In Count V, the Developer Entities assert a claim for their "attorneys' fees and expenses", 
alleging that "[i]n breaching its obligations under the Amendments and Option Agreements, 
AHA has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or bas caused the Developer Entities 
Counterclaim, ~~ 56-64. 
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unnecessary trouble and expense.t" This allegation tracks the language of O.C.G.A. §13-6-11 
which provides: 
The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the 
damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and bas made 
prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, bas been 
stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and 
expense, the jury may allow them. 
(Emphasis added). 
By its express terms, O.C.G.A. §13-6-11 is a remedy available to plaintiffs. "[A] 
plaintiff-in-counterclaim cannot recover attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 unless he 
asserts a counterclaim which is an independent claim that arose separately from or after the 
plaintiff's claim." Byers v. McGuire Properties. Inc., 285 Ga. 530, 540 (2009). Insofar as AHA 
initiated this action and the Developer Entities' counterclaim arose from that complaint and the 
allegations therein, such that they are compulsory counterclaims, expenses of litigation are 
unavailable to the Developer Entities. Accordingly, Count V of the counterclaim is hereby 
DISMISSED. 
E. Plaintiff's Motion to Extend the 90-Day Stay of Discovery 
Plaintiff AHA asks the Court to extend the stay of discovery under O.C.G.A. §9-11- 
12(j)( 1) due to the pending motions in this matter. Given the Court' s rulings above and having 
considered the record, the Court orders that discovery as to the remaining claims shall commence 
upon entry of this order and Plaintiffs shall respond to any outstanding written discovery within 
fifteen (15) days of the entry of this order, if it has not done so already. Counsel for the parties 
are directed to confer regarding case management deadlines and submit a proposed case 
management order to the Court. Plaintiff's motion is otherwise DENIED AS MOOT. 
6 Counterclaim, ~67. 
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SO ORDERED this ~ 0 - 
G JOHN GOGER, on behalf of 
~ BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Metro Atlanta Business Case Division 
Fulton County Superior Court 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
SERVED THROUGH EFILEGA TO: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaim 
Defendant Plaintiffs 
Reginald Snyder J. Matthew Maguire, Jr. 
Clinton E. Dye, III Jennifer K. Coalson 
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303 75 Fourteenth Street, Suite 2600 
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Tel: (678) 705-7795 Tel: (404) 873-8000 
Fax: (404) 393-3872 Fax: (404) 873-8050 
rsnyder@dyesnyder.com mmaQ.Uire(@.Qcwlawfum.com 
tdye@dyesnyder.com j coalson@Qcwlawfirm.com 
mcamenter@Qcwlawfirm.com 
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